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Although some recent studies have analysed issues relating to credit in African manufacturing, 
they have not directly tested for the effect of credit on firm growth. The use of bank credit can 
affect firm growth in two opposite ways. The effect may be positive if credit allows a firm to 
address its liquidity constraint and increase profitability. However, if macroeconomic shocks such 
as increases in interest rates make firm debts unsustainable as experienced in Kenya in the 1990s, 
indebted firms may shrink or even collapse. Hence, empirical testing is necessary to determine 
which effect dominates in a specific case. Using microeconomic data on the Kenyan 
manufacturing sector, the study finds that conditional on survival, the firms that use credit grow 
faster than those not using it.  This result is robust to alternative estimation procedures, 
controlling for both endogeneity of the credit variable and selection bias. Convergence in firm 
size is significant in all the models except the GMM estimation that controls for several forms of 
endogeneity. The significance of convergence contradicts Gibrat￿s law of proportionate effects 
while supporting Jovanovic￿s learning hypothesis. 
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The use of bank credit can affect firm growth in two opposite ways. The effect may be 
positive if credit allows a firm to address its liquidity constraint, increasing profitability 
and firm expansion. However, similar to other African economies struggling to cope 
with macroeconomic instability resulting from the introduction of liberalisation measures 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Kenya experienced strong macroeconomic shocks in 
the 1990s. For instance, interest rates doubled while the Kenyan shilling was repetitively 
devalued in the first half of the 1990s. These conditions may have forced indebted firms 
to shrink or even collapse. Hence, only empirical testing may show specifically how the 
use of credit affected the growth of Kenyan firms. 
This paper is an empirical study of the effect of initial size and access to credit on 
Kenyan firms￿ rates of growth. Notwithstanding the limits imposed by available data, the 
paper shows that the use of credit increases surviving firms￿ growth, lending support to 
firm managers￿ claim that access to credit is one of the main problems they face. This 
finding is robust to several estimation methods, namely OLS, nonlinear least squares 
(NLS), instrumental variable (IV), fixed effects (FE), GMM, and Heckman￿s selection 
model. Furthermore, the paper finds evidence that small firms have higher rates of 
growth (or lower rates of decline) than large ones supporting the convergence hypothesis 
but contradicting Gibrat￿s law of proportionate effect. 
  The work in this paper is akin to the studies of the Industrial Surveys in Africa 
(ISA) Group whose research on African manufacturing over the last decade is a 
landmark. Among the aspects of African manufacturing covered by the members of the 
Group, collectively and individually, are the following: investment [Bigsten, et al. (1999b); 
Soderbom and Teal (2000)], inventory holding as a risk coping mechanism [Fafchamps, et 




(1999)], returns to human and physical capital [Bigsten Arne, et al. (2000)], contract 
enforcement [Bigsten A., et al. (2000); Fafchamps (1996)], exports of manufactured 
products [Bigsten, et al. (1999a)], credit constraints [Bigsten, et al. (2003); Fafchamps, et al. 
(1994); Fafchamps (2000); Fafchamps, et al. (1994); Fafchamps, et al. (1995)], and trade 
credit [Fafchamps (1997)]. 
  We devote special attention to the potential problem of endogeneity between 
access to credit and firm growth.  In the first part, an instrumental variable approach 
using information on firm start-up is pursued to account for endogeneity. In the second 
part of the analysis, data covering the period 1992-1994 is used to estimate fixed effects 
and GMM models to account for potential endogeneity due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. Given that only surviving firms can grow, we test for the significance of 
the selection bias and its impact on the effect of the credit variable.  
The main contribution of the paper is to show the effect of credit use on a firm￿s 
rate of growth amidst macroeconomic instability. Although some of the studies cited 
above have dealt with the issue of credit in African manufacturing, they have not directly 
tested for the role of credit on firm growth. Moreover, many studies analysing firm 
growth have estimated OLS models [see for instance Evans (1987a), Evans (1987b)] 
which do not account for endogeneity and selection bias in a systematic way. These 
studies produce misleading results as Teal (1999) has shown. When he estimates a simple 
OLS model, he finds evidence of convergence. However, accounting for endogeneity 
makes convergence insignificant. 
The analysis uses two sample periods.  The first period is from firm creation to 
the first time a firm was sampled, namely the years 1992 and 1999.
1 The second period is 
a panel of three-year data points covering the years from 1992 to 1994. The main 
difference between these two periods is shown in the average growth rates. Before 1992, 
                                                 




firms were growing at a yearly average rate of 7 percent. However, firms that entered the 
sample in 1999 post a negative rate of -1 percent and the average growth rate of firms 
observed over the period from 1992 to 1994 is about -2 percent. The difference in 
growth rates is probably due to the crisis that hit the Kenyan economy in the 1990s.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature on the 
determinants of firm growth, focusing on the role of credit and convergence. Section 3 
derives the empirical equation of growth which we estimate by NLS, OLS and IV using 
data on firm start-up. Section 4 re-estimates the growth model by fixed effects and GMM 
techniques to address different aspects of the potential problem of endogeneity. The data 
used is a panel covering the period from 1992 to 1994. Section 5 estimates a Heckman 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) model to correct for a potential self-
selection bias. Section 6 concludes and proposes some issues for further research. 
 
2. Literature on Credit and Firm Growth 
This section discusses the literature on the effect of credit on firm growth followed by a 
brief overview of the different theories of firm growth, their contradictions and 
implications for firm growth in Kenyan manufacturing. 
 
2.1. How Does the Use of Credit Affect Firm Growth? 
The use of bank credit can affect firm growth in two opposite ways. The effect may be 
positive if credit allows a firm to address its liquidity constraint, becoming more 
profitable and leading to firm expansion. However, in economies with macroeconomic 
instability, the increase in interest rates increases the stock of debt, which may destabilise 




Macroeconomic growth regressions show some evidence of the importance of 
financial factors in the process of economic growth [see Easterly and Levine (1997), 
King and Levine (1993)]. At the microeconomic level, there is a widely held view that 
slow growth of firms in Africa is the result of a lack of access to financial resources [see 
Levy (1993); McCormick, et al. (1997); Biggs and Srivastava (1996)]. Moreover, the 
neoclassical literature analyses the effect of financial market imperfections on investment 
[see Fazzari, et al. (1988); Hubbard (1998); Hubbard, et al. (1995); Ndikumana (1999)], 
which may provide the link between access to credit and firm growth. As firms are credit 
rationed [Jaffee and Russell (1976); Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Bigsten, et al. (2003)], they 
may be forced to curtail investments.  
Credit is less of a constraint in developed countries than in Africa. Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995: 12) report on the results of a survey showing that in the U.S. ￿only 12 
percent of managers and owners of companies with 6 to 500 employees considered 
￿difficulty in obtaining￿ financing to be the ￿most serious problem￿ for their company￿. In 
contrast, most firm managers in Africa complain that credit is the most serious 
impediment to their activities. Two reasons explaining this difference may be the 
diversified financial markets in developed economies and the fact that developed 
economies rarely experience credit and other economic shocks of the magnitude seen in 
developing economies.
2 
In developing economies, credit is often regarded not as a business deal but 
rather as a favour. Before the liberalisation of the financial sector in Tanzania in the early 
1990s, even after fulfilling all the pre-conditions attached to lending,
3 securing a loan still 
required side payments from applicants and the processing of loan applications took six 
months on average [Levy (1993)]. In this context, firms prefer retained profits as the 
                                                 
2The problem of funding seems to be shared by firms in transition economies of Eastern Europe [see for 
example, Brown, et al. (2003)]. 




most reliable source of investment finance in Africa. In this light, the study by Bigsten, et 
al. (1999b) has found that investment in African manufacturing is positively related to 
profit levels although estimated elasticities of investment to profit are relatively small.  
 T he relationship between credit and growth may be through channels other than 
investment. For example, access to external resources allows flexibility in resource 
allocation [see Fafchamps (1997)]. In periods of crisis when customers are unable to pay 
on time as is often the case in many African economies [Fafchamps (1996); Bigsten, et al. 
(2000)] bank loans limit the impact on firm activity of the drop in firms￿ cash flow, 
allowing them to function normally. 
Moreover, firms with access to funding are able to ￿build up inventories to avoid 
stocking out when faced with demand shocks or late input delivery￿ [Fafchamps, et al. 
(2000: 861)]. Hence, about two-thirds of firms in Kenya say that without credit facilities, 
they would respond to a liquidity problem by cutting down production and limiting their 
size [Fafchamps, et al. (1994)]. As a result, firms with limited internal reserves may be 
forced to close down or postpone strategic investments if they do not have access to 
bank funding. Firms without access to bank funding, especially overdrafts, are also 
vulnerable to external shocks. 
In this light, with financial market imperfections, asymmetric information and 
agency costs affecting more adversely small borrowers in Africa￿s credit markets [Azam, 
et al. (2001); Bigsten, et al. (2003); Fafchamps (2000); Fafchamps (1997); Raturi and 
Swamy (1999); Atieno (1998); Aryeetey, et al. (1997)] small firms may never be able to 
borrow from the formal market in order to invest and grow. This suggests that the 
differences in firm growth may be explained by start-up conditions. High-budget firms or 
those able to borrow are able to start with an efficient size that allows them to grow 
faster [Shorrocks (1988); Mengistae (1998)]. Geroski (1995) found that firms creating 




plants grow to a size 2.5 times larger that that of the average incumbent over a period of 
ten years. There may be, therefore, a direct relationship between access to finance, start-
up size and firm growth. 
 
2.2. Initial Size and Theories of Firm Growth 
Firm size is important in developing economies. For instance, many believe that micro 
and small firms in those economies are the most vibrant businesses in terms of job 
creation and income generation [Reineccke (2002); Mead and Liedholm (1998); 
McPherson (1996); Mead (1994)].
4 On the other hand, large size is important in African 
manufacturing because they may realise scale economies. Moreover, large firms have 
more capacity to lobby government officials for favours ranging from tax exemptions to 
the awarding of contracts [Gauthier and Gersovitz (1997); Mead and Liedholm (1998)].  
How does initial size relate to firm growth? One of the oldest propositions 
regarding the relationship between firm size and the rate of growth is due to Gibrat 
(1931). In his celebrated ￿Law of Proportionate Effect (LPE)￿, he postulates that firms￿ 
rates of growth are independent of their initial sizes. As Mansfield (1962: 1031) puts it, 
Gibrat Law implies that ￿the probability of a given proportionate change in size during a 
specified period is the same for all firms in a given industry, regardless of their size at the 
beginning of the period￿.  
This proposition is disputed by Bain (1956) who argues that there is a Minimum 
Efficient Scale (MES) which is achieved when a firm attains a size corresponding with 
the minimum long run average cost. Firms with sizes smaller than the MES enjoy 
economies of scale until they reach the MES but all firms beyond the MES are 
characterised by constant returns to scale. Hence, firms below the MES experience 
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slower growth, on average, relative to those with the optimal size, contradicting Gibrat￿s 
law. 
The third theoretical strand is associated with Lucas (1978) and Jovanovic (1982). 
Lucas￿ thesis is that the equilibrium size distribution of firms depends on the distribution 
of managerial capabilities within a population. According to this argument, any firm size 
may be optimal given its manager￿s ability. Building on Lucas￿ theory, Jovanovic (1982) 
proposes a ￿learning model￿ in which firms learn about their efficiency levels once they 
are established; managers ￿guess￿ their firms￿ efficiency from a distribution of efficiency 
rates. As managers learn from their past guesses they update their information base and 
formulate better guesses in the future.  
This process narrows the variance between the guessed and the actual levels of 
efficiency as firms grow older. According to Jovanovic (1982: 656) ￿younger firms have 
more variability in their growth rates. They will also grow faster than the older firms￿ as 
the productivity parameter of mature firms converges to a constant. Jovanovic￿s model, 
therefore, predicts a negative relationship between age and firm growth.  
The problem with Jovanovic (1982) model is that it is static as it keeps the 
efficiency parameter fixed. Pakes and Ericson (1987) extend the model by invoking 
human capital formation as a way of altering the efficiency parameter. Their model 
assumes that managers possessing the largest stock of human capital are better placed to 
make the best guesses, implying that they are capable to run their firms more efficiently. 
As a result, firms with high human capital register higher rates of growth relative to those 
with low human capital. 
Directly or indirectly, the theories of firm growth assume growth to be every firm 
manager￿s objective. However, there may be cases where firms have a different objective. 
The first case is when economic conditions are so hard that firms fight for survival rather 




equilibrium sizes, choosing to remain small if they realise returns to their entrepreneurial 
ability [Asea (1996)]. Thirdly, firms may not need to grow if they occupy strategic niches 
that are better served by small size [Agarwal and Audretsch (1999)]. There may be also 
firms that choose to grow horizontally [Bigsten (2002)], especially in the informal sector.  
Moreover, firm growth entails a transformation that has advantages but also 
disadvantages. Growing from a small informal firm to a large business has the advantage 
of formal institutional recognition and the benefits accompanying it. They include more 
prestige and more ability to raise external resources. However, this form of growth has 
also participation costs such as higher taxation and more social responsibilities for the 
firm owner [see Levenson and Maloney (1998)]. If the benefits of growth are outweighed 
by the costs, a firm may rationally choose not to grow. Nonetheless, our assumption in 
this paper is that growth is the objective of most firms. 
 
2.3. Using Insights from the Growth Model to Analyse Firm Convergence 
We empirically analyse firm growth and convergence using insights from the Solow 
growth model used in empirical macroeconomic studies. One key assumption underlying 
the Solow model of economic growth is that individuals save a fixed share of their 
income. These savings are invested to accumulate capital which in turn is rented out to 
firms for use in productive activities. Whether capital and output grow depends on their 
position relative to the steady state. Below the steady state, individuals have an incentive 
to invest and accumulate more capital. Beyond the steady state, the capital stock is 
reduced until it reaches the steady state level [see Jones (2002)].  
In this regard, economies with the same level of technology, same investment 
rates and same population growth share the same steady state. Among these economies, 




description corresponds to what is termed absolute convergence hypothesis. It states 
that on average, among countries with the same steady state, poor countries should grow 
faster than richer ones.
5 Barro (1991) calls the process  convergence β − . However, in 
reality, countries may have different steady states. In this case,  convergence β −  
becomes conditional as it measures the effect of initial income level on the rate of 
growth, controlling for the determinants of the steady state. 
A third concept,  convergence σ − , relates to the tendency of the dispersion in 
income measured, for instance, by standard deviation, to decline over time. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1990) show that over time, the variance in the size distribution falls (or 
rises) if the initial variance in the size distribution is greater than (or less than) the steady 
state variance. In other words,  convergence β −  is necessary but not sufficient for 
convergence σ −  [Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990: 13)].  
Using a methodology developed for macroeconomic analysis to analyse a 
microeconomic question does not pose a fundamental problem, as long as the 
methodological analogy is appropriate. After all, the methodology championed by Quah 
(1993b) and Quah (1993a) to analyse differences in economic growth across countries 
was initially designed to study the patterns of income distribution and earnings mobility 
in the microeconomic literature.  
Therefore, the model of individual accumulation underlying growth is not 
fundamentally different from the pattern of firm evolution. Many firms start small, save, 
invest and grow, the same way an economy does. Also, firms may have a steady state size 
beyond which additional growth is not beneficial. As in the growth literature, it is 
reasonable to assume that small firms below the steady state size display higher growth 
                                                 
5 The convergence hypothesis in Macroeconomic analysis has been attributed to the work of Solow (1956). 
However, Mankiw, et al. (1992) note that ￿the Solow model does not predict convergence￿ [It] predicts 
convergence only after controlling for the determinants of the steady state, a phenomenon that might be 
called ￿conditional convergence￿￿. Quah (1993a) argues that neither absolute nor conditional convergence 




rates than firms close to the steady state. This catch-up process is similar to the concept 
of convergence discussed above. Hence, firm convergence implies that the relationship 
between start-up or any past size and the growth rate is negative. This paper uses the 
concept of conditional  convergence β − . It is clear that the convergence hypothesis 
violates Gibrat￿s law but is in agreement with Jovanovic￿s interpretation. 
Empirically, it is usually found that Gibrat￿s law holds only for firms larger than a 
certain size [Bain (1956); Evans (1987a); Hall (1987); Mansfield (1995); Simon and Bonini 
(1958)]. Recent empirical studies of Africa￿s manufacturing have found some evidence of 
convergence. Examples include Ethiopia [Mengistae (1998)] and Burundi [Sleuwaegen 
and Goedhuys (1998)]. A similar relationship has also been found to hold in studies of 
small firms in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe [see Mead and 
Liedholm (1998)]. This latter study found a positive relationship between initial size and 
growth in the Dominican Republic. In Ghana, Teal (1999) found that once endogeneity 
is controlled for, there is no evidence of convergence. 
 
2.4. Other Factors Affecting Firm Growth 
In addition to size, age and credit, another factor that may explain the differences in firm 
growth in Kenya is the ethnic background of the owner. The importance of this variable 
for firm performance in Africa has been highlighted by a number of authors including 
Collier and Gunning (1999); Fafchamps (1997); Fafchamps (2000); Fisman (2003); 
Fisman (1999); and Raturi and Swamy (1999). The growth of firms owned by Kenyans of 
African origin is expected to be slower than firms owned by Kenyans of Indian origin. 




Indian origin for a long time.
6 The sector of activity and the location of a firm may also 
be important determinants of its rate of growth. 
 
3. Estimating a Convergence Equation Using Start-up Data  
The first sub-section derives the empirical convergence equation. The second sub-section 
presents the empirical data and the third subsection discusses estimation issues and 
empirical results. 
 
3.1. Deriving a Convergence Equation  
Empirical testing of the theories of firm growth discussed in the previous section is 
performed on the basis of a convergence equation.  
 
3.1.1. The Basic Growth Equation 
What is the theoretical basis for growth regressions? This question is rarely asked when 
empirical models of growth are estimated. Almost every author derives a growth 
equation from a Solow model by log-linearising around the steady state. This approach 
has critics.
7 
Elbers and Gunning (2001) argue that growth regressions have no sound 
theoretical basis for three reasons. First there is no economic behaviour in the Solow 
model because ￿capital accumulation has no choice-theoretic basis.￿ Secondly, the model 
is deterministic as it does not incorporate uncertainty. To address these two issues, the 
authors suggest the use of models belonging to the class of the stochastic Ramsey 
framework. The third criticism is about log-linearising around the steady state.  
                                                 
6 To understand the process leading to this situation, see Phillips, et al. (2000); Bigsten (2002); and 
Delf (1963). 




Elbers and Gunning find that there is only one log-linear model in the class of 
stochastic Ramsey models that generates a canonical growth equation. However, they 
caution that the model is implausible for two reasons: capital depreciates fully within one 
period and changes in risk have no impact on investment. Given these shortcomings, the 
authors propose that the log-linear growth specification should be abandoned. 
These criticisms of growth regressions are founded and we address them as 
follows. Firstly, as we do not assume a constant savings rate, the first criticism regarding 
capital accumulation does not affect our analysis. Secondly, we agree that the growth 
models in this paper do not capture uncertainty. This issue is addressed in a different 
paper on firm mobility where firm growth and exit are modelled in a unified framework 
[see Nkurunziza (2004)]. Exits reflect the extent to which shocks, particularly the shock 
to interest rates and other macroeconomic variables, affected firm survival in the 1990s. 
The last criticism regarding log-linearising around the steady state is also addressed in the 
same paper where we analyse growth by modelling the distribution of firm size rather 
than log-linear models. 
We derive a basic convergence equation where a firm with a start-up size  ( ) 0 ln S  
reaches its steady state size  ( )
* ln S  when  ( ) ln / 0 t dS d t = . The transitional dynamics to 
steady state is assumed to be approximated by the following differential equation: 








β ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦                                        (1) 
where subscripts  , it refer to firm and time period, respectively, with  1, 2,... iN = and 
1, 2,... tT = . Hence,  ( ) ln it S  is firm 
th i size at time t and  ( )
* ln S  is the steady state size 
determined by a vector of variables  i x .
8 β  is the rate of convergence towards the steady 
state. Hence the bracketed term at the right hand side of equation (1) is the ￿distance￿ 
                                                 




between current and steady state size. The relation  ( ) ( )
* ln ln it SS =
 
may not be 
observed either because firm i is not in steady state at time t or because the firm has its 
own long run equilibrium size that differs from  ( )
* ln S . Equation (1) may be rewritten 
as a non-homogeneous first-order differential equation that is mathematically 
manipulated to yield an estimable growth equation: 








ββ +=                               (2) 
Solving equation (2) for  ( ) ln it S using the complementary function 
i t Ae
β − and the 
particular integral  ( )
* ln S (assuming  ( ) ( ) ln / 0 it dSd t ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦  following convention):
9   
( ) ( ) ( )
*
0 ln( ) ln 1 ln
ii tt
it i Se S e S
ββ −− =+ −                                  (3) 
In order to derive an estimable firm growth model from equation (3), we subtract 
( ) 0 ln i S  from both sides, divide through by  i t  and add a stochastic error term i u : 













ββ −− −− − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎡⎤ =+ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦              (4) 
Note that the coefficient of  ( ) 0 ln i S  varies with  i t , the time elapsed since firm creation. 
Hence, estimating equation (4) requires nonlinear least squares. The left-hand side of 
equation (4) is 
th i firm average annual rate of growth. The transformation from equation 
(3) to equation (4) is necessary if  i t  varies across firms. This problem does not arise in 
macroeconomic growth regressions since countries are observed either using the same 
time interval in panel data or using the same period of observation for all countries. 
To test for the theories of firm growth discussed above, we are first interested in 
determining the size and sign of the coefficient on initial size given as: 
                                                 













=−                                                          (5) 
For given values of age, the convergence parameter β  can be recovered from equation 







qualitatively, a high  coefficient λ −  implies a high convergence rate. Convergence ￿ la 
Barro is established when β  is significant.  
 
3.1.2. Variables Used to Estimate the Empirical Equation 
What are the variables used to empirically test the theories of firm growth and what are 
their predicted signs? As discussed above, initial size should not be significant according 
to Gibrat￿s law. According to the MES principle, size is positively correlated with growth 
at least up to the MES. However, Jovanovic (1982) proposes an opposite prediction. He 
explains that young firms are usually small and that surviving firms increase their size as 
they become more experienced. This process predicts a negative relationship between 
firm size and growth.  
Regarding the variables that capture the steady state, we use age, credit use and 
ethnicity of the firm owner. Age is used to proxy for a firms￿ learning process and its 
movement to steady state. Equation (4) shows that the variable age is integrated in the 
computation of the convergence coefficient through  i t . Therefore, age is in the vector of 
variables explaining steady state only in cases where the period of observation is the same 
across firms.  
Introducing credit in the growth equation changes the transitional dynamics. In 
an economy with a perfect capital market, steady state size may be achieved 
instantaneously through borrowing. In this case, there are no transitional dynamics of 




would start with a size exactly equal to the steady state size. However, in reality, this may 
not be the case for two reasons. 
Firstly, in light of Jovanovic (1982) models, firms at start-up may not know their 
steady state size. Secondly, start-ups in African economies cannot be assumed to be 
credit unconstrained. Evidence in RPED data shows that 80 percent of start-ups use 
personal savings to fund their capital and Bigsten, et al. (2003) establish that firms in 
Africa are credit constrained. Therefore, the hypothesis that a firm in Africa uses credit at 
start-up to reach its steady state in one period is not tenable. Credit is expected to have a 
positive and significant relationship with firm growth. With respect to ethnicity of the 
owner, firms owned by Kenyans of African origin are expected to grow less than firms 
owned by Kenyans of Indian origin.  
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics and Construction of the Variables 
The data is divided into two samples. The first sample uses start-up information for 224 
firms surveyed in 1992. The second is made up of about 70 firms that were surveyed for 
the first time in 1999 and provided information on their start-up conditions. The models 
compare results on the full sample and on the two sub-samples separately. A pooling test 
rejects the null, suggesting that the new firms entering the sample in 1999 were not 
drawn from the same distribution as those from 1992. Therefore, although we show the 










Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Models Using Start-Up Variables 
  Full Sample  1992  1999 
Variables  Mean  S. D. Obs.  Mean S. D. Obs.  Mean  S. D.  Obs. 
Growth Rate 
Ln current Size 
Ln start-up Size 
Age 
Ln age 
Square ln age  
Ln (age*size) 
How Long C/A 
Loan at start-up 
Kenyan African 















































































































The size variable used is the log of a firm￿s number of full time workers. The choice of 
this variable is standard practice in the literature on developing economies. The variable 
is relatively easy to count and it does not need to be deflated unlike alternative measures. 
For instance, sales, production and profitability are thought to be more prone to large 
measurement errors (and need to be deflated) than the ￿number of workers￿ variable. 
Some studies have found an association between the change in the number of 
workers and other measures of firm activity. Mead and Liedholm (1998) report findings 
of studies that have found that in Kenya and in the Dominican Republic, the growth in 
real sales is twice that in the number of workers. They conclude that the use of the 
number of workers variable may be considered as a conservative, lower-bound estimate 
of net firm expansion. 
Growth rate, size, age and how long has a firm had a current account are 
continuous variables. All the other variables are binary. The credit variable takes value 1 
if a firm used a bank loan to finance part of or all its start-up capital and zero otherwise. 




between Kenyans of African origin, those from Asian descent (we call them Kenyans of 
Indian origin as Kenyans of Asian descent originated principally from India) and Others. 
This latter group is made up of non-Kenyans, Kenyans of Middle Eastern origin and a 
few observations we could not place in either of the first two groups. 
 The variable whether a firm used credit at start-up measures more directly the 
impact of access to bank credit on growth. It may be argued that the amount of credit 
used is a better measure of a firm￿s involvement with the banking sector. There are 
different reasons why we do not use this measure. First, we are not primarily interested in 
the impact of the amount of credit on firm growth. The question of direct interest to our 
analysis is whether or not a firm has had access to bank loans not how much it secured. 
If a firm secures access to bank finance, it breaks an important entry barrier into the 
credit market. Once in the market, reputation makes it relatively easy to negotiate the 
amount of the loan as studies on informal credit have shown [see, for instance, McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999b)].  
The second reason for not using the amount of credit is that the variable is 
plagued with measurement errors. It is no secret that firms manipulate their balance 
sheets to evade taxation and the amount of outstanding credit is one of the variables they 
manipulate. Thirdly, in the period 1992-1994, many firms did not respond to this 
question so there are relatively few observations. When we use the variable (lagged), only 
30 percent of the sample remains (from about 315 to about 90 observations) raising the 
fear of a severe selection bias.  
 
3.3. Estimation Issues and Empirical Results of Models Using Start-up Variables 
The use of the data raises a number of econometric issues. These are nonlinearity, 









Estimating the model in equation (4) by OLS may produce biased parameters as it is 
clearly nonlinear in parameters. As time (or firm age) goes to infinity, λ  goes to zero; 
implying that the influence of initial size on a firm￿s rate of growth is stronger the 
younger the firm. Therefore, β  and λ  must be estimated using nonlinear least squares 
(NLS) method [see Wooldridge (2002)]. The extent to which the NLS results differ from 
OLS qualitatively and quantitatively is shown by comparing estimates from the two 
procedures.
11 
To account for the nonlinearity in the relationship between firm growth and its 
explanatory variables in OLS models, we will estimate a growth model with squared log 
of age.  
 
3.3.2. Endogeneity Due to Simultaneity and Heterogeneity 
Reverse causation between access to credit and firm growth is a potential source of 
endogeneity. It is plausible that the firms using credit are the ones that grow, suggesting 
causality from growth to credit use. Hence, estimating equation (4) by OLS produces 
biased results. To address the problem, we estimate current growth on start-up credit 
use.
12 Using start-up credit could still be correlated with firm specific factors that 
                                                 
10 Analysis covering the period 1992-1994 addresses the potential problem of endogeneity by using panel 
data techniques. The same data is used to address the problem of self-selection. 
11This problem concerns only the models using start-up information. In the period post-1992, all firms are 
observed over the same period even when they have different ages. Hence OLS models can be estimated, 
but such estimation raises other issues that we discuss below.  
 
12 However, even if credit is pre-determined, it could be argued that credit use was based on expected 




simultaneously determine credit use and growth. Firms that used start-up credit were 
probably particular, and the factors that allowed them use credit may be the same 
explaining their growth. To eliminate this source of bias, we instrument credit drawing 
on firm and owners￿ characteristics that are correlated with credit but not with growth.  
 
Table 2: NLS and OLS Models from Start-up to 1992 and 1999 
Dependent variable is annual growth rate in firm size 
  Nonlinear Estimation  OLS Estimation 
 Full 1992 1999 Full 1992  1999


































































































































































































































Numbers in brackets are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Numbers in 
parentheses on the credit variables are adjusted from NLS estimates for comparison with OLS parameters. 
Three, two and one star, correspond to 1 percent, 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively. The 
reference groups are Kenyans of Indian origin for ethnicity and wood for sector of activity. Coefficients on 





Equation (4) is estimated nonlinearly in the first three columns. The  Parameter β −  is 
directly estimated in the NLS model but the corresponding values for OLS are implied on 
the basis of equation (5).
13 The coefficients on start-up size in the NLS model are derived 
using the same approach. It is noteworthy that implied NLS coefficients of the start-up 
variable are equal or close to OLS coefficients, implying that the two models predict the 
same effect of initial size on firm growth. The implied convergence rates from the two 
models are also very close.  
NLS coefficients must be adjusted before they can be compared with OLS 
parameters. The reason is that NLS coefficients are function of age. NLS estimation 
procedure computes  NLS i γ δλ =∗
) )  where δ
)
 is the coefficient reported in Table 2, and  i λ  
is the variable given in equation (5). Since  i λ  varies according to the age of a firm, it is 
possible to compute an ￿average￿ NLS coefficient  NLS γ δλ = ∗
)
 using average age. 
Applying this procedure, the coefficients on the credit variable are shown in Table 2 in 
parentheses below the standard errors. 
  A quick inspection of NLS and OLS shows that both models capture the 
significance of the two variables of interest, namely credit use and start-up size. The 
following discussion is based on NLS results. 
 
Credit and Growth: The use of the variable credit access at start-up is an attempt to 
address the problem of endogeneity due to reverse causation. Access to bank credit 
appears to have a positive effect on firm growth in 1992 but not in 1999. The positive 
sign and significance of the coefficient in 1992 suggest that firms that use credit record 
higher growth rates than those without access to credit. The size of the coefficient is 0.12 
                                                 
13 The implied  Parameter β − for 1999 could not be calculated as it required the computation of 




in 1992 (and 0.06 for OLS), implying a substantial effect of credit on growth. As 
expected, in the 1990s, the coefficient turns negative both in NLS and OLS models, 
although it is not significant. This is a suggestion that credit harmed firm growth in the 
1990s, a question that is studied in Nkurunziza (2004).  
 
Start-up Size and Growth: Both in 1992 and 1999, the convergence parameter is highly 
significant in the NLS model and start-up size has a negative and significant coefficient in 
OLS. The fact that start-up size has a significant impact on the rate of growth contradicts 
Gibrat￿s law of proportionate effect. Using the half-life measure to proxy for the 
dynamics to steady state, the findings suggest that it took firms eleven years to cover 50 
percent of the gap between current and steady state size before 1992 while it took one 
year in the 1990s.
14 
  There are two possible interpretations of the half-life figures. The first is that a 
high figure translates slow movement to steady state. The second interpretation is that a 
high figure shows opportunities of growth since firms starting closer to their steady state 
size will have lower growth opportunities. This latter interpretation seems to be 
consistent with the Kenyan case. Firms in the 1992 sample enjoyed higher growth 
opportunities than those in the 1999 sample.  
By comparison, Evans (1987a) and Evans (1987b) propose an interpretation 
closer to the first case. He finds that American firms with an average age of four years 
and having sizes comparable with those in Kenya took nine years to move halfway 
through to their steady state. However, the half-life of firms with an average age of 10 
years was about 21 years. Obviously, the comparability of the figures for Kenya and 
                                                 
14 The half life of a firm￿s start-up size is given by ln 2 / β . For the derivation of the formulae, see Jones 




those for America is limited by the fact that they relate to two different economies 
analysed over different economic cycles.
15 
 
Age and Growth: Given the NLS estimation procedure, it is impossible to isolate the 
effect of age on firm growth using NLS results. However, OLS coefficients show that 
age was not significant in 1992 and that its net impact was positive in 1999, contradicting 
Jovanovic￿s model. However, we cannot draw conclusions on the basis of the OLS 
model given that it is not the right estimation procedure. 
 
Other Controls: NLS results do not support the result that firms owned by Kenyans of 
African origin grow less than those owned by Kenyans of Indian origin but OLS results 
do. The NLS result is in accord with the finding by Aguilar and Kimuyu (2002) that 
ethnicity has no significant impact on firm growth in Kenya, although they use a 
different sample.  
  Despite the fact that simultaneity is addressed by using start-up access to credit, 
there may still be endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity at start-up. We 









                                                 




Table 3: Instrumental Variable Estimation of Firm Growth 
Dependent variable is annual growth rate in firm size 
  Full Sample  1992 Sample 
  IV (2SLS) First-stage  IV (2SLS)  First-stage 



































































































Owner has motor vehicle 
 
 
Owner has real estate 
 
 
Owner has previous experience 
 
 





















































Adjusted R-squared (Centred) 
 
F-test of excluded instruments 
 
 
Hansen J-test of overidentification 
 
 













































Numbers in brackets are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Three, two and one 
star, correspond to 1 percent, 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively. R-squared statistics are for 
the first stage regressions. Uncentered and centred R-squared are for the 2SLS regressions. Bracketed 
values for the F and J-statistics are p-values. Reference groups are Kenyan of Indian origin and wood for 




Four instruments are used to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Three of them relate 
to the owner and one to the firm. Whether an owner has a motor vehicle and real estate 
should be highly correlated with access to credit. Owning a car in Africa is perceived as a 
sign of prestige which may increase the perception of credit worthiness even when a 
motor vehicle cannot be used as collateral. An owner￿s past experience in the industry 
may suggest that the owner has built a reputation as a trustworthy borrower, so the 
variable should be positively correlated with credit use. Limited liability firms are 
dominant in the modern sector and hence have the highest probability of using bank 
loans.  
Since information on firm specific characteristics is available only on firms 
managed by their owners, the sample size is reduced by half. How appropriate are the 
instruments? The F-test of excluded instruments rejects the null that the coefficients on 
the instruments in the first-stage regression are jointly equal to zero. Moreover, Hansen￿s 
J-test of overidentification does not reject the null that the set of instruments is 
appropriate. We, therefore, deduce that instrumentation for the credit variable is 
appropriate.  
As in the NLS and OLS models of Table 2, access to credit and start-up size are 
significant with the expected signs. The positive coefficient of the credit variable 
confirms the results in Table 2 that firms that used credit at start-up grew faster than 
those that did not. The negative sign of the size variable suggests that firms tend to 
converge to their steady state. The age variable is not significant as in the OLS regression 
of Table 2. The reason may be that once start-up conditions are properly accounted for, 
age has no influence on the growth process. For instance, part of the impact of age on 
growth may be captured by access to credit if age is interpreted as a proxy for reputation, 




One problem with the IV regression in Table 3 is that it estimates a linear model 
while we have already noted that NLS is the appropriate estimation. An alternative way 
of instrumenting credit and estimating NLS is to use the predicted values of the first-
stage regression in Table 3 as an instrument of the credit variable. The results are 
reported in Table 4. 
  
Table 4: Nonlinear Estimation of Growth Instrumenting Credit 
Dependent variable is annual growth rate in firm size 
  Full Sample 1992 Sample  



















































































Numbers in brackets are White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Numbers in 
parentheses on the credit variables are adjusted from NLS estimates for comparison with OLS parameters. 
Three, two and one star, correspond to 1 percent, 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively. The 
reference groups are Kenyans of Indian origin for ethnicity and wood for sector of activity.  
 
As in the previous cases, the credit and start-up size variables are highly significant with 




of Table 3 but they are double those of the NLS model in Table 2 where credit is not 
instrumented. The derived effect of start-up size in Table 4 is comparable with the value 
in Table 2. In summary, the qualitative results relating to the two variables of interest are 
comparable across the range of estimations reported in Tables 2 to 4. 
The question is whether or not the IV estimation has improved the results of the 
OLS model and NLS models. The objective of estimating different models is to show 
whether NLS, IV, Fixed effects, GMM and Heckman are improvements over OLS. 
Focusing on the credit variable, we use a Hausman test to determine whether the 
difference between the coefficient of the OLS and alternative models is significant.
16 The 
test is specified as [Wooldridge (2002)]: 
() ()
1 22
ALT OLS ALT OLS ALT OLS H γγ γγ σσ γγ
− ′ ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦
)) )) )) ))                         (6) 
where  H  is the Hausman t statistic. The null is that the coefficient of the alternative 
model is not significantly different from the OLS coefficient. Therefore, rejection of the 
null implies that the alternative model is an improvement over the OLS specification 
whereas a failure to reject the null means that one should stick to the OLS estimates. The 
parameters  ALT γ
)
 and  OLS γ
)
 are estimated coefficients of the alternative and OLS models, 
respectively, while 
2
ALT γ σ ) ) and 
2
OLS γ σ ) ) are the respective variances of the coefficients. The 













− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
) )
))
                                      (7) 
The t-statistic of the Hausman test that the credit coefficient of the IV regression is 
different from that of the OLS model is 4.30 and 1.45 for the full and 1992 models, 
respectively. The meaning is that IV improves on the OLS result when the full sample is 
                                                 
16 Wooldridge (2002: 120) notes that ￿rather than comparing the OLS and 2SLS estimates of a particular 
linear combination of the parameters--as the original Hausman test does￿it often makes sense to compare 




used but there is no improvement on the 1992 sample. Since our focus is on the 1992 
model, the conclusion is that the credit effect is not due to reverse causality or 
heterogeneity at start-up. 
 
4. Credit, Growth and Convergence: Panel Data Analysis 
Lagged credit and the instrumental variable approach pursued above do not address all 
the possible sources of endogeneity. There could still be endogeneity due to time-varying 
unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, a firm could borrow because it expects higher 
rates of growth in the future. In this case, expected growth determines credit use. 
Furthermore, we may need to deal with time invariant unobserved heterogeneity not 
captured by instrumental variable in Table 3.  
In the first sub-section, we develop the methodology used to correct for 
endogeneity. The second sub-section presents the data used to estimate the growth 
model and the third sub-section discusses the empirical results.  
 
4.1. Endogeneity and Panel Data Estimation 
In the period from 1992 to 1994, we use fixed effects to solve the problem of 
endogeneity due to time invariant heterogeneity. This estimation approach wipes out the 
omitted variable bias if the omitted effects are time-invariant. However, as we discuss 
below, using fixed effects may introduce a new type of endogeneity when applied in the 
context of a model with a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable.  
Endogeneity due to time varying factors not included in the estimation but 
correlated with both credit and growth are difficult to instrument since it is difficult to 
determine which time varying instruments may be correlated with access to credit but 




addressed through the use of a GMM estimator. The latter uses time varying appropriate 
lags and differences of exogenous independent variables that are used as internal 
instruments. GMM estimation provides also a framework to address the problem of 
endogeneity due to fixed effects estimation in models with lagged dependent variables.  
The derivation of the fixed effects and the GMM estimator is sketched below. If 
all the firms are observed over the same time interval, the growth model in equation (4) 
simplifies to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,, , , ln ln ln it it it i t i it SS Sx ττ θ γµ ν −− −= + + +                     (8) 
where  i µ  and  , it υ  are time-invariant and time-variant error components, respectively.
17 
Normalising  1 τ = , we have  ( ) 1 e
β θ
− =− −  and  ( ) 1 e
β γ
− =− . The vector x contains all 
other variables explaining growth. The growth equation (8) is equivalent to: 
( ) ( )
*
,, , , ln ln it it it i it SS x τ θ γµ ν − =+ + +                                      (9) 
where 
* (1 ) θθ =+ . First differencing equation (9):  
( ) ( )
*
,, 1 , , ln ln it it it it SS x θ γν − ∆= ∆ + ∆ + ∆                          (10) 
given that ,, 1 0 it it µµ − −= . Estimation of equation (10) does not suffer from endogeneity 
due to time invariant heterogeneity since differencing wipes out time invariant effects. 
However, the method introduces a new endogeneity problem. By inspection, we see that 
( ) ,1 ,1 ,0 it it ES ν −− ≠  due to the relationship between  ,1 it S − and  ,1 it ν −  in equation (10). 
Therefore, estimating equation (10) by OLS produces biased estimates of 
* θ . Nickell 
(1981) identifies three characteristics of the bias: (i) it is negative for positive values of 
* θ ; (ii) it increases with 
* θ ; and, (iii) it (slowly) decreases as sample size increases. The 
                                                 
17 The term  i µ  is also called unobserved effect, fixed effect, or unobserved heterogeneity. The time-




second characteristic of the bias implies that OLS regressions of equation (10) may lead 
to a wrong conclusion of fast convergence.  
In order to solve the problem of endogeneity introduced by first-differencing, 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose the use of an instrumental variable approach that 
instruments  ( ) ,1 ln it S − ∆  in equation (10). They suggest a vector of instruments 
( ) ,2 , [ln , ] it it Z Sx − =∆  assuming that all variables in , it x ∆ are exogenous. Building on 
Anderson and Hsiao￿s result that  ( ) ,2 ln it S − is a good instrument, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) argue that if that is the case, then  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,3 ,4 , ln ,ln ...,ln it it it k SS S −− − are also good 
instruments, leading to the following moment restrictions: 
( ) ( ) ,, ln 0     2,3,....,( 1) it j it ES f o r j N ν − ∆= = −                                   (11) 
and: 
,, ( ) 0     1,2,3,....,( 1) it k it Ex f o rk N ν − ∆= = −                               (12) 
when all variables in  x are exogenous. In our case, since credit is assumed to be 
endogenous, equation (12) becomes: 
,, ( ) 0     2,3,4,....,( 1) it k it Ex f o rk N ν − ∆ == −                       (13) 
Equations (11)-(13) show that there may be more valid instruments than endogenous 
variables. In order to combine the instruments efficiently, Arellano and Bond propose 
the use of Hansen (1982) Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator. It is 
computed in two steps. First, all the instruments are concatenated in a single vector: 
( ) ( )
*
23 1 2 3 ln ,ln ,..., , , ,... tt t t t ZSS x x x −− − − − =∆ ∆ ∆ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦                                   (14) 
Then, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the instruments denoted H A , is 
computed to combine them efficiently and then used to derive the GMM estimator: 
**1 ** () GMM H H X ZAZX X ZAZy δ
− ′ ′ ′′ =
)




The main advantage of the GMM over the Anderson Hsiao instrumental variable 
estimator is that it is efficient (albeit asymptotically) as it uses more moment restrictions 
than the latter. In addition, if any of the variables in  , it x  is endogenous, appropriate 
instruments can be found using pre-determined and exogenous variables within the 
system. The fact that internal instruments are available to help resolve the problem of 
endogenous explanatory variables makes GMM an appealing estimation method. 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics and Construction of the Variables 
We first present and discuss the descriptive statistics covering the period 1992 to 1994. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for models Using 1992-1994 Data 
Variables Mean Standard  Deviation Observations 
Growth Rate 
Ln Size 
Ln lagged Size 
Ln age 
Ln age squared 
Loan use 
Lag loan use 
Has overdraft 
Lag has overdraft 
Kenyan of African origin 










































































These data have the advantage of allowing growth rates calculated on equal periods. The 
disadvantage of the data is that they cover only a short period of three years between 
1992 and 1994. Despite this limitation, the nature of the sample allows the estimation of 
dynamic models that is impossible with the Pre-1992 sample. Hence, the results of the 
models in the two sub-samples should be seen as complementary.  
In the post-1992 period, the construction of the loan variable is as follows. The 
variable takes value one when a firm has a positive balance on loans. Given that the 
variable has many missing values, the following sequence explains how they are treated. 
The variable takes value 1 if a firm did not apply for a loan in the last year because it was 
already in debt. The value is zero when a firm claims it has never used a loan. The value 
is also zero if a firm has not operated a current account. The variable takes value zero 
also if a firm claimed it did not apply for a loan because it did not need one. Then, as we 
are interested in the use of past loans, any firm with value 1 in a year is given 1s in all 
subsequent years. Conversely, any firm with a zero in a year is given zeros in all previous 
years. Finally, whenever there is a missing value corresponding with a year where the 
balance on loans is zero, the missing is changed into a zero. Loans used before 1992 are 
not specifically considered unless they were still being serviced in 1992. Table 4.6 gives a 
snapshot of the logic underlying the construction of the credit variable. 
 
 
Table 6: Construction of the Loan Dummy Variable (t is current year) 
Indicator Variables  Loan Dummy Variable 
Positive current balance on loans 
No new loan because already in debt 
Never borrowed 
Never had a current account 
Not applied because no need for a loan 
If loan dummy is 1 at time t 
If loan dummy is 0 at time t 






1 in all following years  






The Overdraft credit variable takes value 1 if a firm has access to overdrafts and zero 
otherwise. 
The other explanatory variables are size measured as the log of the number of 
full time workers. Six observations that had no data on the number of full time workers 
were replaced by the total number of workers. Age indicates the number of years since 
firm creation. Sectoral dummy variables are added to control for sectoral effects. About 
ten firms were recorded in different sectors in different waves. To correct for the 
inconsistencies, a firm coded several times in a sector but only once in another sector 
was given the code that came more frequently. When a firm was coded once in a sector 
and once in a different sector, we kept the latest coding as we realised that most errors 





















                                                 
18 The data on ethnicity was only available in 1992 and 1999. To fill the gaps in 1993 and 1994, we assumed 
that ownership did not change over the period so a firm that had data on ethnic status of the owner in 
1992 kept the same status throughout the sample period. Similarly, for a firm that had no information on 
ethnicity status in 1992 but had information in 1999, we used the latter to fill the gaps. Finally, a few firms 
that had no information in either year are in a third category called ￿Other ethnicity￿. This third group 
comprises also the few firms owned by individuals from other ethnic backgrounds. These are non-Kenyans 




4.3. Empirical Results 
The results of OLS, fixed effects and GMM are compared in the following table. 
 
Table 7: OLS, Fixed Effects and GMM Models of Firm Growth: 1992-1994 








Lag of loan use  0.212** 0.485*** 0.658***  0.640***
 [0.093] [0.164] [0.229]  [0.228]
Lag of overdraft use  0.112 0.168 0.318*  0.178*
 [0.112] [0.144] [0.185]  [0.133]
Loan use (level)  -0.009 
 [0.166] 
Overdraft use (level)  0.503** 
 [0.248] 
Lagged log size  0.811*** -0.297*** 0.086  0.041
 [0.035] [0.071] [0.211]  [0.189]
Log age   0.170 -0.613 -0.803  -1.215
 [0.264] [0.422] [0.889]  [0.914]
Log age squared   -0.026  
 [0.049]  
Kenyan of African origin   -0.030  
 [0.107]  
Other ethnicity  0.120  
 [0.129]  
Textiles sector  0.076  
 [0.094]  
Food sector  0.152  
 [0.110]  
Metal sector  0.091  
 [0.101]  
Constant 0.095 5.065*** 0.058  0.060
 [0.348] [1.135] [0.106]  [0.096]
R-squared 0.86 0.53  
R-squared within  0.23  
F-statistic 190.04*** 9.38*** 1.96*  3.16*
Observations 315 315 117  122
Numbers in brackets are White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Three, two and one star, 
correspond to 1 percent, 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively. The reference groups are Kenyan 
of Indian origin and wood for ethnicity and sector of activity, respectively. 
 
No test for overidentifying restrictions is reported for the GMM model because it is not 
overidentified. The reason is that of the 3 data points available, two are used to lag and 
first-difference the variables so instrumentation uses one cross-section.
19 Fixed effects 
and GMM estimations control for heterogeneity and simultaneity. Therefore, the positive 
sign and significance of the loan variable suggest that the importance of the effect of 
loans on firm growth is not due to endogeneity.  
                                                 
19 This also explains the small samples used for the GMM models. Arellano and Bond (1991) lose three 




There is a notable increase in the coefficient and the significance of the lag of 
loan use when we move from the OLS to the fixed effects model. This appears to imply 
a negative correlation between the fixed effects and loan use. One explanation may be 
that, on average, firms with a high fixed effect have a lower likelihood of using loans. 
This could be the case when the fixed effect reflects firm characteristics such as the 
quality of management that enables a firm to use its internal resources more efficiently, 
implying less reliance on loans. 
It is relevant to note that controlling for endogeneity, there is no evidence of 
convergence in the period 1992-1994, confirming the result found by Teal (1999) using 
Ghanaian data. 
  Using the Hausman test to compare the loan coefficient over the four models in 
Table 4.7, none of the alternative estimations seems to be an improvement over the OLS 
estimate. The t-statistic of the Hausman test of the fixed effects against OLS is 1.68, 
suggesting that we cannot reject the null that the Fixed effects and OLS coefficients are 
equal. Similarly, comparing OLS and GMM coefficients, the t-statistics are 1.09 for both 
versions of the model, suggesting that the two coefficients are statistically the same. 
 
5. Credit, Growth and Selectivity Bias 
Potential selection bias is the last issue we address. Although the literature on firm 
growth usually ignores the potential problem of self-selection, selection bias may arise 
from the fact that growth analysis is only carried out on a sub-sample of surviving firms. 
If survival is not random, the results of the growth model will be biased. Mansfield 
(1962) conjectures that the negative growth-size relationship uncovered in empirical 
studies is the result of slowly growing firms exiting. Accordingly, entry and exit should be 




practice, failures are omitted from the sample and analysing firm dynamics based on 
surviving firms does not necessarily introduce a significant bias [Jovanovic (1982)].  
Many studies, including some in Africa, have tested for the bias due to self-
selection and found it non-significant. In his study of medium and small enterprises in 
Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, McPherson (1996) tests for 
the sample selection bias for Swaziland and Zimbabwe. He finds that sample selection is 
non-significant. Evans (1987a) and Evans (1987b), using data on American small 
businesses finds a similar result.  
Atkinson, et al. (1992) refer to a number of studies using the Michigan University 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that have found no significant selection bias. 
Using data on the period 1992-1994 we test for the significance of the selection bias 
applying a Heckman Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. This 
method estimates an OLS-type regression of firm growth conditional on a selection 
equation determining whether or not a firm is observed. A selection bias is significant 
when the process driving growth is related to the process driving firm exit, measured by 
the correlation between the residuals from the two equations.















                                                 
20 An alternative method of determining the significance of the selection bias is to include the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) from the selection equation into a growth equation. Since IMR measures the extent of the 
selection bias for each observation, the significance of its coefficient in the growth equation indicates a 




Table 8: Heckman FIML Selection Model of Firm Growth: 1992-1994 
Dependent variable is Ln of current size for the regression equation and the probability that a firm is 
observed in any year during the sample period for the selection equation.  
  OLS Equation Regression Equation Selection Equation
Lag of loan use  0.212** 4.501*** -0.657***
 [0.093] [0.572] [0.233]
Lag of overdraft use  0.112 0.308 0.477*
 [0.112] [0.294] [0.244]
Lagged size  0.811*** 0.610*** 0.087
 [0.035] [0.206] [0.064]
Log of Age  0.170 -1.147 0.237*
 [0.264] [1.305] [0.124]
Log of Age squared  -0.026 0.250
 [0.049] [0.255]
Kenyan of African origin  -0.030 0.573 0.334
 [0.107] [0.467] [0.241]
Other ethnicity  0.120 2.582*** -0.492*
 [0.129] [0.592] [0.285]
Textiles sector   0.076 0.308
 [0.094] [0.233]
Food Sector  0.152 0.364
 [0.110] [0.251]
Metal Sector  0.091 0.328
 [0.101] [0.205]
Dummy for year 1993  1.424***
  [0.173]
Constant 0.095 1.530 -1.572***
 [0.348] [1.571] [0.461]
Log pseudo-likelihood  -173.101
2 Wald χ −  
561.56***
ρ   -0.997***





Observations 315 315 315
Numbers in brackets are robust White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Three, two and one 
star, correspond to 1 percent, 5 and 10 percent significance level, respectively. The reference groups for 
ethnicity and sector of activity are Kenyan of Indian origin and wood sector, respectively. The bracketed 
value under the 2(1) test χ  of  0 ρ = is a p-value. 
 
The sectoral and time dummies are introduced in the selection equation to model the 
probability that a firm is observed in any given year. As Nkurunziza (2004) discusses in 
more details, firm failures tend to be sector-specific, hence motivating the introduction 
of the sectoral dummies in the selection equation. These variables are not significant in 
the regression equation but they are in the selection equation (The metal sector is 




effect of the policy shocks that hit the Kenyan economy. They were most profound in 
1993.  
The value of the 
2(1) χ  statistic of the  test ρ −  of independence of the 
regression and selection equations is 4.69 with a p-value of 0.03. The null of independence 
between the two regressions is rejected, implying that the growth model and the selection 
equation must be estimated simultaneously. However, although self-selection is 
statistically significant, the positive sign and high significance of the loan variable in the 
growth equation of the Heckman model mean that the effect of credit on firm growth is 
not due to a selection bias, strengthening the results from previous models.  
If anything, the effect of credit on firm growth is larger when the selection bias is 
controlled for. The fact that ρ  is negative and highly significant combined with the 
finding that the effect of credit on firm survival is negative and highly significant imply 
that conditional on firm survival, the effect of credit on firm growth is positive. In terms 
of magnitude, the Heckman model produces the highest coefficient of all the models we 
have estimated.  
 
5. Conclusion 
All the models suggest that conditional on firm survival, access to credit increases firm 
growth. This result is robust to several estimations and different sample periods. The 
instrumental variable approach is used to control for endogeneity using data covering the 
period from firm creation to the first time a firm was interviewed in 1992 or 1999. The 
findings show that the positive effect of credit on firm growth is not due to endogeneity. 
For the period between 1992 and 1994, fixed effects and GMM panel data estimation 




The finding from a Heckman FIML estimation used to control for a potential 
selection bias finds that the bias is significant but that the effect of credit on firm growth, 
conditional on survival, is even stronger. These findings lend support to the hypothesis 
that the lack of access to credit may be an important impediment to firm growth as 
claimed by firm managers in Kenya.  
In many models, initial size is negative and significant, supporting the 
convergence hypothesis but, at the same time, contradicting Gibrat￿s Law of 
proportionate effect. The fact that age is weakly related to growth in most models 
suggests that the variable may not proxy for efficiency as suggested by Jovanovic. The 
impact of the variable on firm growth may be through reputation and hence the credit 
variables. Indeed, in models excluding the credit variables, the age coefficient increases 
and becomes significant in some of them.  
In summary, we have responded to the two questions raised at the beginning of 
the paper. Firstly, access to credit appears to be an important determinant of firm 
growth, supporting the claim made by business leaders in Kenya. Secondly, there is 
evidence that initial size is an important determinant of firm growth in line with the 
convergence hypothesis but in contradiction with Gibrat￿s law. 
Among the issues the paper has not explored, the following three are worth 
noting. The impact of age and credit on firm growth could be through productivity. Are 
growing firms those that can borrow and invest into better technologies? Secondly, the 
study of growth over the 1990s needs to be complemented by analysis of firm resilience 
given that the 1990s was a period of economic crisis. This question is tackled in 
Nkurunziza (2004). Thirdly, the paper focused on the behaviour of firm size out of 
equilibrium. An equally relevant issue is the unconditional distribution of size where the 
short term transients have lost influence. This question is analysed in Nkurunziza (2004) 
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